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Grand expanses of desert and barbed-wire fences span long stretches of the American– 
Mexican border. The borderlands have rarely, if ever, felt political peace since the 1848 Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo and the 1854 Gadsden Treaty resolved the border line. The same can be said 
about the largest river the countries share. The Colorado River transcends the boundary between 
the United States and Mexico, with an international legal overlay to divide the water dating back 
to World War II. Since that time, maps of the river’s scope and path have remained static, betraying 
the reality that withdrawals from the river now render its riverbed a desert miles before the delta 
in the Gulf of California.    
 
Since 1944 and the passage of the “Treaty on Utilization Of Waters Of The Colorado And 
Tijuana Rivers And Of The Rio Grande,” the United States and Mexico have developed 
arrangements to divide the waters of the Colorado between them. Of the 17.5 million acre-feet of 
water originally estimated to flow annually through the river, the United States measures for 
delivery down the river to Mexico a quantity of 1.5 million acre-feet per year. The estimates of the 
river’s annual flows on which this arrangements is predicated grossly over-estimated the river’s 
actual annual flows, resulting in the United States having a lesser supply of water than it originally 
anticipated. Between 1895 and 2003, annual flows through the Colorado actually measured 
approximately 15 million acre-feet annually (prior to flow withdrawals). As a result, allocations 
of the river’s flows have come to exceed the actual quantity of the river. In the last fifty years, the 
Colorado River has reached its terminus at the Gulf of California only a handful of times. The rich 
riparian environment surrounding the delta, once famously described as comprising “a hundred 
green lagoons,” now forms a featureless mudflat across its historical acreage. 
 
This thesis provides an analysis and critique of efforts by the national governments of the 
United States and Mexico, and efforts by NGOs, to rewater the Colorado River Delta for ecosystem 
maintenance and restoration. The International Boundary and Water Commission passed Minute 
323 in September of 2017 to memorialize the commitments of the United States, Mexico, and a 
coalition of non-governmental partners to bring life back to the delta. Although it represents the 
most robust effort undertaken to restore the delta, Minute 323 also reflects inadequate 
commitments from the United States and Mexico to collaborate for meaningful change in the delta. 
This thesis analyzes the legal and historical context behind Minute 323 and contributes a critical 
analysis of its environmental flows program, concluding that a more permanent arrangement is 
necessary to secure the future of the delta, as well as to reflect modern principles of conservation 
and equity. An analysis of the 1944 treaty, its Minute system, and international principles of equity 
demonstrate that a full amendment of the treaty to specifically allocate water for instream 
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For the last word in procrastination, go travel with a river reluctant to lose his 
freedom in the sea.1 
 
The Colorado River rambles a rugged 1,450 miles from its headwaters in the peaks of the 
Colorado Rocky Mountains all the way to Mexico, providing water to forty million people along 
its course.2 Its journey ends where the river meets the sea in Mexico—or, at least, it once did.3  In 
the last fifty years, the Colorado River has rarely reached its terminus in the Gulf of California.4 
The two-million-acre Colorado River Delta once consisted of lush riparian zones and tidal 
wetlands that supported diverse plant, bird, and marine life.5 Today, upstream demands for water 
have reduced the river to only 1% of its pre-development flows at the delta, which now forms a 
salted mudflat across the majority of its historical reach.6 The delta struggles to support the 
hundreds of thousands of birds and various endangered species that still depend on its shrunken 
wetlands, while the region’s farmers voice dismay over a quickly declining groundwater table.7 In 
                                               
1 ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 150–51 (Oxford U. Press ed., 1949). 
2 J. Robison et al., Challenge and Response, 16 WATER POL’Y 12, 20 (Supp. 1, 2014); Bradley Udall & 
Jonathan Overpeck, The Twenty-First Century Colorado River Hot Drought and Implications for the Future, 53 
WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 2404, 2405 (2017).  
3 See EVAN R. WARD, BORDER OASIS: WATER AND THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF THE COLORADO RIVER 
DELTA, 1940–1975 xvii–xxx (U. Ariz. Press, ed., 2003). 
4  IBWC, SONORAN INSTITUTE, COLORADO RIVER LIMITROPHE AND DELTA ENVIRONMENTAL FLOWS 
MONITORING FINAL REPORT 21 (2018),  [hereinafter IBWC FINAL REPORT]. 
5 Jennifer Pitt et al., Two Nations, One River: Managing Ecosystem Conservation in the Colorado River 
Delta, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 819, 819 (2000). 
6 Jennifer Pitt et al., Two Nations, One River: Managing Ecosystem Conservation in the Colorado River 
Delta, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 819, 819 (2000).  
7 RETHINKING THE FUTURE OF THE COLORADO RIVER: DRAFT INTERIM REPORT OF THE COLORADO RIVER 
GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, 3 (Natural Res. Law Ctr., Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. 2010). In addition to the environmental 
devastation caused by the overconsumption of river resources, it is also necessary to acknowledge the impacts of 
shortages on certain human populations in the delta region. See Anita Alvarez Williams, People and the River, 39 
JOURNAL OF THE SOUTHWEST 331 (1997). In particular, the Cocopah (or Cucapá), have historically depended upon 
delta waters and have faced hardship from delta shortages. Id. Understanding that the law of the river is subject to a 
complex history and hardened criticisms with respect to indigenous populations, and that a responsible analysis of that 
history deserves more space than this Comment can offer, this Comment focuses solely upon efforts to restore the 









the midst of growing concern for the delta’s future, there are left unanswered questions as to who 
bears culpability for its desiccation, as well as who bears responsibility for its restoration.  
 This interdisciplinary thesis explores the environmental, geographical, and legal contexts 
that gave rise to Minute 323, the latest international effort to bring life back to the delta.8 Adopted 
in September 2017, Minute 323 registers commitments from the United States, Mexico, and a 
binational, non-governmental partnership, to provide flows and funding to the delta for the purpose 
of environmental restoration over the next decade.9 Part II of this thesis describes the river and the 
delta for background, while Part III briefly considers the existing legal framework for international 
relations on the river.10 Part IV evaluates the Minute’s environmental flows program, then Part V 
offers a critical analysis of the program, describing its failure to contrive an equitable or politically 
sustainable solution between the countries.11 Part V identifies a need for permanent change in the 
delta that extends beyond the transient and modest obligations imposed by Minute 323.12 While 
Minute 323 deserves recognition as the most substantial effort to date toward achieving delta 
restoration, the Minute also presents hidden costs to stakeholders and the environment, as well as 
procedural and substantive legal defects.13  Ultimately, these shortcomings render the Minute 
system politically and environmentally unsustainable, despite the short-term successes of the 
program. Part V offers several alternative legal mechanisms for a future environmental flows 
program in the delta, particularly aimed toward long-term environmental sustainability, as well as 
                                               
8  IBWC, MINUTE NO. 323, EXTENSION OF COOPERATIVE MEASURES AND ADOPTION OF A BINATIONAL 
WATER SCARCITY CONTINGENCY PLAN IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN (Sept. 21, 2017), 
https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min323.pdf [hereinafter MINUTE 323]. 
9 Id.  
10 See infra sec. II, III.   
11 See infra sec. IV, V.  
12 See infra sec. V.  









increased social and political equity.14  
II. THE COLORADO RIVER DELTA 
A. HISTORICAL LANDSCAPE PERSPECTIVE: “A HUNDRED GREEN LAGOONS”15  
1. Physical Geography of the Colorado River Basin 
 The Colorado River’s mainstem and tributaries comprise the largest river system in the 
United States.16 The system is presumed to furnish some 17.5 million acre-feet of water for 
agricultural, municipal, recreational, and industrial activities in Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, as well as the Mexican states of Sonora and Baja 
California.17 The region through which the river flows can be dissected into two discrete drainage 
basins at Lees Ferry: an Upper Basin encompasses parts of Arizona,  Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, 
and Wyoming; a Lower Basin encompasses parts of Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Utah, and Mexico.18 The Upper Colorado River Basin generates approximately 90% of the annual 
flows through snowmelt.19 As previously noted, the river connects with the Sea of Cortés at its 
delta. The delta supports a number of wetland, estuarine, and marine ecosystems which birds, fish, 
and indigenous peoples have historically relied upon.20   
                                               
14 See infra sec. V.  
15 Aldo Leopold once famously described the delta as comprising “a hundred green lagoons.” LEOPOLD, 
supra note 1, at 150. 
16 LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL, COLORADO RIVER BASIN, IN WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 6 (R. Beck, ed., 
2005).  
17 Colorado River Compact, 1923 Colo. Sess. Laws 684, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101 to -104 (West 2019).   
18  Drought in the Colorado River Basin, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, 
https://www.doi.gov/water/owdi.cr.drought/en/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).  
19 Id.  
20  See generally Alvarez-Williams, supra note 7 (offering anthropological and first-hand accounts of 
indigenous relationships with the river); Edward P. Glenn et al., Restoration Potential of the Aquatic Ecosystems of 
the Colorado River Delta, Mexico: Introduction to Special Issue on “Wetlands of the Colorado River Delta,” 59 



















            Figure 1: The Colorado River Basin21 
 
The collective 17.5 million-acre feet upon which domestic and international allocational 
schemes are predicated represents the average annual flows in the river from 1895 to 1922.22 
Unbeknownst to the drafters of numerous domestic American compacts and agreements that 
divided these waters to the basins and states, the period during which the 17.5 million acre-foot 
average was recorded represented some of the wettest years in the history of the Colorado River.23 
Between 2005 and 2015, the river’s annual average volume measured only approximately 13.4 
million acre-feet.24  
2. The Colorado River in the Western Imagination 
 Observers of the Colorado River have long imagined it as a force and personality in its own 
right. John Wesley Powell’s 1869 account of the Colorado River is a testament to the river’s 
                                               
21  George Patten, A River Runs Through it, Again, GREAT ECOLOGY (Apr. 11, 2014), available at 
http://greatecology.com/colorado-river-runs/. 
22Climatic Fluctuations, Drought, and Flow in the Colorado River Basin, U.S. GEO. SURV. (Aug. 2004), 
available at  https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2004/3062/.  
23 C.A. Woodhouse et al., Updated Streamflow Reconstructions for the Upper Colorado River Basin, 42 
WATER RES. 2404, 2405 (2017).  









primacy in early Western experience.25 Powell directed the U.S. Geological Survey from 1881 to 
1894, and was an esteemed explorer, geographer, and ethnologist. 26  In 1869, Powell led an 
expedition down the Colorado River to pioneer the first comprehensive geographic and 
ethnographic depiction of the river.27 Wallace Stegner’s famous narration of this expedition, based 
upon Powell’s journals, painted the following picture of Powell’s encounters with the river: 
It was July 21 before they pushed off into the real Colorado, the old man himself, 
an awesome river wide and deep and the color of cocoa. The thousand yards of 
serene current visible from the junction lengthened out to three miles. Then rapids, 
bad ones, in quick succession. . . . Through most of its course the canyoned Green 
and Colorado, though impressive beyond description, awesome and colorful and 
bizarre, is scenically disturbing, a trouble to the mind. It works on the nerves, there 
is no repose in it, nothing that is soft. The water-roar emphasizes what the walls 
begin: a restlessness and excitement and irritability.28 
When Powell observed it, the Colorado River flowed with an intensity sharp enough to spite the 
deserts and arid regions that encompassed it. As Professor MacDonnell—a longtime scholar on 
the “Law of the River”— has described, “[t]he Colorado is not a river that would have been the 
cradle of civilization. It flows through rugged country with surprisingly few open valleys 
susceptible to irrigation. . . . It is an arid country, and the water needed to make it habitable for 
people is not easily available.”29 Nonetheless, the Colorado has provided a liquid lifeline for 
generations of indigenous people, and millions of Americans and Mexicans today.30  
 
 
                                               
25 STEGNER, WALLACE, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN: JOHN WESLEY POWELL AND THE SECOND 
OPENING OF THE WEST  88 (1954). 
26   John Wesley Powell, U.S. GEO. SURV., available at https://www.usgs.gov/staff-profiles/john-wesley-
powell?qt-staff_profile_science_products=3#qt-staff_profile_science_products (last visited Mar. 20, 2019).  
27 Id.  
28 Stegner, supra note 25, at 88.  
29 MacDonnell, supra note 16, at 8.   









3. Cultural Landscape of the Cocopah & Cucapá 
Although narratives like those of Powell and Stegner illustrated a wild river incompatible 
with human civilizations, indigenous peoples throughout the United States and Mexico built 
thriving communities upon the delta corridors centuries prior to Powell’s expedition.31 In the delta 
region specifically, communities of Cucapá (or Cocopah) Indians in the Sonoran Desert depended 
upon annual floods for crop irrigation and used the river for fishing for hundreds of years.32 The 
Cucapá and Cocopah people once shared a single geographic and tribal identity until the 1848 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo between the United States and Mexico bisected the Cucapá historical 
land holdings along the Colorado.33 At one point, between six- and seven-thousand Cucapá Indians 
inhabited the delta region, developing sophisticated navigation techniques and an intricate fishing 
culture.34 The wetlands of the delta provided fertile grounds for crops like squash, grains, beans, 
corn, and Palmer’s grass.35 Until as late as the 1960s, many Cucapá people in the delta region 
continued to practice traditional fishing and farming practices, living in arrow-weed thatched 
homes along the delta corridors.36  
Today, less than one thousand Cucapá Indians inhabit the delta region across their several 
reservations.37 While the intention of this thesis is not to relay the cultural and geographic history 
                                               
31 See generally Alvarez-Williams, supra note 7 
32 Id.; Evan Ward, The Twentieth-Century Ghosts of William Walker: Conquest of Land and Water as Central 
Themes in the History of the Colorado River Delta, 70 PAC. HIST. REV. 359, 362 (2001). The Cucapá are also 
commonly referred to as “Cocopah.”  Muehlmann, supra note 30, at 181, n. 5. Most Indians of the Mexican region 
self-identify with the former spelling and pronunciation, so the thesis will utilize this version of the name. Id.  
33 About Us, COCOPAH INDIAN TRIBE, available at http://www.cocopah.com/about-us.html (last visited Apr. 
3, 2019) (hereinafter “Cocopah Indian Tribe”).  
34 Id.  
35 See Alvarez-Williams, supra note 7, at 345.  
36 About Us, COCOPAH INDIAN TRIBE, available at http://www.cocopah.com/about-us.html (last visited Apr. 
3, 2019) (hereinafter “Cocopah Indian Tribe”). 









of Cucapá Indians to the level of comprehension they are owed, their historical presence in the 
Sonoran Desert in southern Arizona and northern Mexico fed a more intimate relationship with 
the Colorado and its delta than perhaps any other civilization has felt.38 The delta, and the Cucapá 
culture of fishing around it, is embedded deeply in Cucapá daily life, language, and identity. As 
Shaylih Muehlmann recorded in his ethnographic studies among Cucapá tribal members, “We are 
here. We eat, we dance, we fish. Here we are and we still live.”39 However, restoration efforts in 
the delta over the past decades have nonetheless excluded Cucapá interests, particularly in 
fishing.40 The remaining wetlands in the delta are primarily designated as Biosphere Reserves in 
which fishing is prohibited.41 As Muehlmann notes, this focus on Cucapá practices “exonerates 
the more powerful political actors and institutions that have prevented the Colorado River from 
reaching the Sea of Cortés.”42 
Modern transformations in the delta in the last century have altered the historical 
environment and cultural narratives in the region.43 With the expansion of white settlement into 
the West, and the development of major cities and industries throughout the last century, the 
Colorado River landscape  has altered drastically given the dependence of people and society upon 
its rare resources.44   
B. THE COLORADO RIVER TODAY  
Today, the river hardly resembles its former wildness. The Colorado River and its average 
                                               
38 See generally Alvarez-Williams, supra note 7.  
39 Muehlmann, supra note 30, at 25 (quoting Cucapá chief Don Madaleno).  
40Id.  
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 172.  
43 See infra sec. II(B).  









yearly flows are tightly controlled, subject to an extensive plumbing system of dams, reservoirs, 
and diversion channels.45 These systems have enabled the growth of inter-basin and trans-basin 
metropolitan areas like Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Phoenix, and Tucson out of arid 
landscapes.46 The river is one of the only significant water resources in this region.47 Today, the 
Colorado River and its tributaries provide a primary supply of drinking water  to one out of every 
ten Americans.48 The Colorado is a lynchpin of the habitability and economic development of this 











      Figure 2: Colorado River Delta, 201449 
 
The limited flows of the Colorado have prompted the creation of many allocational arrangements 
in the West, collectively encompassing the “Law of the River.”50 The seven American basin states 
receive the lion’s share of the total flows and are entitled to receive a total of 16 million acre-feet 
                                               
45 David G. Groves et al., Developing Robust Management Strategies for the Colorado River Basin, in 
ADAPTING TO A CHANGING COLORADO RIVER 21 (2013).  
46 Jason A. Robison & Douglas S. Kenney, Equity and the Colorado River Compact, 42 ENVTL. L. 1157, 
1158 (2012) (citing BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY, 
INTERIM REPORT NO. 1, AT SR-2, SR-10 (2011), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region 
/programs/crbstudy/Reportl/Status).  ` 
47 Id.  
48 Drought in the Colorado River Basin, supra note 18.  
49 Peter McBride, Saving the Colorado River Delta, One Habitat at a Time, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (December 
15, 2014), available at https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/special-features/2014/12/141216-colorado-river-
delta-restoration-water-drought-environment/.  









of Colorado River water among them, subject to a number of domestic compacts.51 Within those 
states, the doctrine of prior appropriation creates strong incentives for users to direct water away 
from the river for certain consumptive uses, making it difficult or impossible to legally require a 
quantity of water to remain instream for ecosystem maintenance.52  
1. Prior Appropriation and Waste 
Given the general scarcity of water in the west, water law governance in the region has 
developed to facilitate the consumption of all available flows, with strong incentives against waste 
of water.53  Prior appropriation governs entitlements to water throughout the West, allocating the 
Colorado’s limited flows to users on a first in time, first in right basis.54 The doctrine provides that 
a user of water establishes a quantified water right for herself simply by diverting a quantity of 
water to a beneficial and consumptive use.55 The doctrine affords priority to senior water users, 
meaning that holders of senior water rights are entitled to their full water right before junior users 
may receive any water.56 Agricultural users, who often hold the most senior rights, as well as 
municipal and industrial users are entitled to exhaust waters to the extent of their rights, without 
regard as to whether that use diminishes available flows for junior users or for downstream 
ecosystem maintenance.57 Several Western states have codified the common law doctrine of prior 
                                               
51 See Colorado River Compact, supra note 17. The Colorado River Compact, which divides water between 
the Upper and Lower Basins, sets forth nuances regarding this allocation which this thesis does not have the space to 
describe fully. For more information on allocations of the Colorado River in the United States, see Robison & Kenney, 
supra note 42.  
52 See infra notes 53–62 and accompanying text. 
53 Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Prior Appropriation: A Reassessment, 18 U. DEN. WATER L. REV. 228, 242 
(2015) (hereinafter “Prior Appropriation”). 
54 Id.  
55 Id. Today, the acquisition of a water right also requires a permit from a state engineer or other relevant 
office. See, e.g., https://www.dwr.state.co.us/SurfaceWater/default.aspx, http://seo.wyo.gov/surface-water.  
56 Id.  









appropriation into statutory codes or state constitutions.58  
The concepts of “beneficial use” and “waste” underwrite the policy for and application of 
the doctrine of prior appropriation. Traditionally, Western water law has considered water not 
directed to a beneficial use, such as municipal supply or irrigation, “waste.” 59  In 1900, the 
chairman of the National Irrigation Congress wrote, “water flows uselessly to the ocean past an 
empire that has waited for centuries to feel the thrill of its living tough. It is like a stream of golden 
dollars which spendthrift Nature pours into the sea.”60  The concept of waste in Western water law 
thus encompasses all water not diverted from its channel in the United States for agricultural, 
municipal, or other development-oriented purposes. 61  The requirement of “diversion” for an 
appropriation ensures that water consumed does not remain in the channel, to the detriment of river 
ecosystems.62 
2. Nature of River Diversions and Appropriations 
Starting in the 1930s, diversions, dams, and reservoirs built to modify the river’s natural 
course have enabled humans to stake claims to and use the river’s waters from even distant 
locations.63 Projects like Hoover Dam (authorized in 1928), Glen Canyon and Flaming Gorge 
dams (both authorized in 1956), and the Central Arizona Project (authorized in 1968) each enabled 
                                               
58 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-151 (West 2019); COLO. CONST. art. 16, § 6 (West 2019); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101(2018) (“A water right is a right to use the water of the state, when such use has been acquired 
by the beneficial application of water. . . . Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and limit of the right to use 
water at all times . . . .”). 
59 Prior Appropriation, supra note 53, at 228–31.  
60 Muehlmann, supra note 30, at 33 (quoting William Smythe, An International Wedding: Tale of a Trip on 
the Borders of Two Republics, SUNSET 286, 288(1900).  
61 Id. American policymakers also used the requirement of diversion from the channel, as well as the limiting 
requirement for beneficial use, to preclude the Cucapá people from asserting rights to the river at the delta. Id. at 41–
42. 
62 Prior Appropriation, supra note 503 at 278–80. 









the diversion of water for trans-basin diversions, storage, and usage.64 These dams, intended to 
supply water and power for the development of the West, also embodied application of the idea 
that man could tame “wasteful” nature for the purpose of development. When constructed, large 
dam infrastructure in the United States (particularly Hoover Dam) overlapped with Westward 
growth as a symbol of American pride, accomplishment, and self-determination during times of 
economic downturn.65 The marriage of nation and nature—or, rather, the dominion of the former 
over the latter—was an important step for reinforcing the American economy and redefining 
national identity in the early to mid-1900s. 66  American interests alone underwrote this 
development, with practically no consultation between the United States and Mexico for basin-
wide management.67 
Due to the wide-ranging dependency on the river—and due to the fact that allocations of 
the river were initially based on inflated estimates of its annual flows—state, municipal, and 
private claimants to the Colorado River have established water rights in amounts that far exceed 
the river’s capacity.68 The structural deficit of water created by founding documents of the Law of 
the River, coupled with humans’ growing demands for water, rising temperatures, and consequent 
variations in precipitation,69 have reduced the total volume of flows that run the river’s full course 
                                               
64 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 617–617v (2012); 43 U.S.C §§ 620–620o (2012); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1556 (2012). 
65  Filippo Menga, Domestic and International Dimensions of Transboundary Water Politics, 9 WATER 
ALTERNATIVES 704, 705 (2016). 
66 Rich Heyman, Locating the Mississippi: Landscape, Nature, and National Territoriality at the Mississippi 
Headwaters, 62 AM. QUART. 303, 305 (2010); id. 
67 Muehlmann, supra note 30, at 45.  
68 J. Robison et al., Challenge and Response, 16 WATER POL’Y 12, 18 (Supp. 1, 2014).  
69  Bradley Udall & Jonathan Overpeck, The Twenty-First Century Colorado River Hot Drought and 









to the Gulf of California.70 Little water—if any— reaches the delta for ecosystem maintenance of 
that region, as compared to the 10–20 million acre-feet of freshwater that historically passed 
through the delta in the years before mass settlement and infrastructure development.71  
3. Climate Change and the Colorado River 
Drought on the river is also a result of climate change, which is projected to worsen 
conditions on the river and delta in the future. As human emissions of greenhouse gases have 
grown, temperatures have steadily increased in the Colorado River Basin. While a minority of 
climate scientists had once been optimistic that climate change would prompt increased 
precipitation sufficient to counteract the drought effects of higher temperatures in the Basin,72 that 
hope has been empirically discounted.  The vast majority (85-90%) of total annual flows in the 
Colorado River originate as runoff in the Upper Basin.73 Between 2000 and 2014, the Upper Basin 
experienced average temperatures approximately .9° C higher than in the previous hundred-year 
period.74 This increase in average annual temperatures produces a number of new demands for 
atmospheric moisture, resulting in increased evaporation of water from surface and soil, 
evapotranspiration from plants, and sublimation from snow.75 In response to the .9° C increase in 
average temperatures, the Colorado River experienced an average 19.3% annual reduction in 
flows, marking the driest 15-year period ever recorded.76  Of this 19.3% reduction, at least 6.4% 
                                               
70 Molly A. Maupin, et al., Estimates of water use and trends in the Colorado River Basin, Southwestern 
United States, 1985–2010, U.S. GEO. SURV. (June 26, 2018), available at 
https://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/sir20185049.   
71 Id.  
72 Udall & Overpeck, supra note 69, at 2404.  
73 Id. at 2407.  
74 Id. at 2409.  
75 Id. at 2408.  









is directly attributable to higher temperatures from human-caused climate change.77  
Per each additional degree rise in annual temperature in the Upper Basin, annual flows in 
the Colorado River are expected to decline 6.5%.78 Over the next century, temperature-induced 
flow losses may reach 17% by 2050 and 25%-35% by 2100. Already, the majority of the delta 
now is indistinguishable from the masses of arid desert surrounding its historical acreage.79   
4. Status of Colorado River Ecosystems 
 Western water governance, diversions, and climate change-induced drought have created 
formidable challenges for the plants and animals which the river and its riparian corridors support. 
Though far from a “cradle of civilization,”80 the Colorado River was and remains an oasis for 
diverse plant, fish, and bird species. The river provides habitat for four endangered fish: the 
humpback chub, Colorado pikeminnow, razorback sucker, and bonytail chub.81 The delta region, 
specifically, supports native vegetation like willow, cottonwood, and mesquite. 82  The delta 
provides brackish water breeding grounds for numerous species of shrimp and fish, including the 
endangered desert pupfish.83 The delta houses species with critical habitat designations, including 
vaquitas (small porpoises that rank among the world’s most endangered marine mammals) and 
                                               
77 Id. at 2404.   
78 See id.  
79 DAVID OWEN, WHERE THE WATER GOES 10 (“People who drive into or out of the town of San Luís 
Colorado, in the Mexican state of Sonora, sometimes complain about having to pay a six-peso toll to cross a bridge 
[across historical delta areas] that spans only sand.”).  
80 See infra note 29 and accompanying text.  
81 The Path to Recovery in the Upper Colorado River Basin, UPPER COLORADO RIVER ENDANGERED FISH 
RECOVERY PROGRAM (2018), http://www.coloradoriverrecovery.org/general-information/general-publications/path-
to-recovery/Path-to-Recovery-webx.pdf.  
82  Natalie Triedman, Environment and Ecology of the Colorado River Basin (2012), available at  
https://www.coloradocollege.edu/dotAsset/cbb78858-d078-4a7c-ba80-2040569abbdd.pdf. 
83 Robert Jerome Glennon & Peter W. Culp, The Last Green Lagoon: How and Why the Bush Administration 









totoaba fish.84 In addition to permanently housing the thousands of resident waterbirds that found 
a home in the delta, the delta is part of the Pacific Flyway, a critical bird migration corridor 
“through which more than 75% of North American birds pass each year as they make their way 
north and south.”85 Today, these species are primarily relegated to accidental wetlands separate 
from the river at points of agricultural wastewater discharge, such as the 40,000-acre Ciénega de 
Santa Clara Wetland in the Sonoran Desert.86 Throughout the rest of the delta, increased salinity 
has allowed the incursion of invasive species like salt cedar or tamarisk to overtake much of the 
natural ecology.87  Many of the remaining delta wetlands are subject to intensive restoration 
schemes, through which environmental NGOs have identified specific segments of the delta 
corridor for active restoration (Figure 3). Restoration efforts include removing invasive species 








Figure 3: Delta Restoration Sites89   
                                               
84 Edward P. Glenn et al., Restoration Potential of the Aquatic Ecosystems of the Colorado River Delta, 
Mexico: Introduction to Special Issue on “Wetlands of the Colorado River Delta,” 59 ECO. ENG’G 1, 3 (2013). 
85 Glennon & Culp, supra note 83, at 909.   
86 Id. at 908.   
87  Natalie Triedman, Environment and Ecology of the Colorado River Basin (2012), available at  
https://www.coloradocollege.edu/dotAsset/cbb78858-d078-4a7c-ba80-2040569abbdd.pdf. 
88 Id.  
89 Raise the River, CONSERVE 2 ENHANCE, https://conserve2enhance.org/program/raise-the-river, last visited 









Overall, the lack of water in the wetlands has diminished the capacity of the delta to support 
plant and animal life.90 This problem is not cabined only to the interests of Mexican people and 
environmental advocates. Many of the species dependent on this region migrate between the 
United States and the Mexican wetlands (primarily birds through the Pacific Flyway), implicating 
environmental advocacy and ornithology interests from the United States.91 In addition to the 
United States water management practices and proportionate contribution to climate change that 
have reduced the amount of water that reaches the delta in a given year, these threats to 
transboundary species present political—and, ultimately, moral—questions as to whose 
responsibility it is to maintain and restore the delta.92  
Various agreements, including a treaty and interpretive “Minutes” that clarify sovereign 
obligations therein, have established rights for water users across national boundaries and 
authorized water development projects to facilitate access to these water rights. In the last ten 
years, this collection of agreements has expanded to impose responsibility upon state and private 
actors for the maintenance of the delta ecosystem. 93  The following section addresses the 
foundational treaty that enabled the hydrological status quo, and then describes more recent legal 
mechanisms designed to rewater the delta for environmental purposes.94  
III. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 The Colorado River is the subject of a thick international legal overlay of water governance 
                                               
90 Id.  
91 See, e.g., Colorado River Basin and Delta, AUDUBON SOCIETY,  
https://www.audubon.org/conservation/project/colorado-river-basin-and-delta (last visited Mar, 20, 2019).  
92 See Armitage et al.,  Science–policy processes for transboundary water governance, 44 ROYAL SWEDISH 
ACAD. SCIENCES 353, 353 (2014) (“Barriers to effective water governance in transboundary settings are significant, 
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93 See infra sec. III(B).  









structures designed to ease conflict over the liquid gold that runs through it. Politically and socially, 
these water governance structures have shaped environmental relations between the United States 
and Mexico. Physically, this legal overlay has resulted in the channelization and diversion of the 
river to serve private, municipal, and other uses of water.95  
A. U.S.-MEXICO TREATY OF 1944 
The first major installment of international law on the Colorado River was the U.S.-Mexico 
Treaty of 1944 (Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio 
Grande) (treaty). 96 The treaty followed decades of disputes regarding the proper allocation of the 
river’s resources, beginning in the late 1800s.97 A push from stakeholders who aimed to dissipate 
their anxieties over the security of massive anticipated water infrastructure projects, like Hoover 
Dam, ultimately led to the first attempts to negotiate a treaty.98  The first (though ultimately 
unsuccessful) treaty negotiations began in the 1920s, an era in which the United States 
contemplated the construction of many more dams and diversions over the next decades that 
threatened to make less water available downstream.99   
However, both Mexico and the United States faced time-sensitive concerns over agreeing 
to a treaty. On one hand, the American doctrine of prior appropriation incentivized water users to 
exhaust water available to them, in order to boost the amount of water that they could reasonably 
                                               
95 See infra Figure 4.  
96 Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado 
and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994 [hereinafter U.S.-
Mexico Treaty]. 
97 See Allie A. Umoff, An Analysis of the 1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty: Its Past, Present, and Future, 32 
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 69, 72 (2008). 
98 Id.  
99 Prevailing mementos of pro-development sentiments during this period and the years following include 
Hoover Dam (authorized in 1928), Glen Canyon and Flaming Gorge dams (both authorized in 1956), and the Central 
Arizona Project (authorized in 1968). See 43 U.S.C. §§ 617–617v (2012); 43 U.S.C §§ 620–620o (2012); 43 U.S.C. 









stake a claim to, potentially depleting the amount of water that Mexico had historically received 
downstream.100 In fact, many American water users at this time considered water left to Mexico 
the same as they considered water left to the sea: both scenarios constituted the “waste” of water.101 
Perhaps in response to this sentiment among American water users, the United States briefly 
considered the adoption of a doctrine that a nation has absolute sovereignty over the water within 
its territory, permitting nations to act without regard for the water dependencies of neighboring 
riparian nations.102 Yet, Mexico flexed its own leverage to secure its position in the allocational 
framework. For its part, Mexico threatened to cut-off waters of the Rio Grande to the United States 
if a water allocation agreement could not be reached with regard to both the Rio Grande and the 
Colorado.103 Absent a treaty, more serious conflict was imminent between the states.104  
To resolve these tensions, the United States and Mexico finally signed a treaty on February 
3, 1944.105  By establishing an allocational and administrative framework for sharing of the waters 
of the Colorado and other shared rivers, the treaty ratification purported to settle the foregoing 
uncertainties over ownership of the river’s flows, as well as generate a plan for the construction of 
                                               
100 See Umoff, supra note 97, at 71–73. The doctrine of prior appropriation provides that a user of water 
establishes a quantified water right for herself simply by diverting a quantity of water to a beneficial and consumptive 
use. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101(2018) (“A water right is a right to use the water of the state, when such 
use has been acquired by the beneficial application of water. . . . Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and 
limit of the right to use water at all times . . . .”). See also Prior Appropriation, supra note 50, at 242.  
101 Muehlmann, supra note 30, at 33. This application of  “water wasted” reflected racialized views of Mexico 
that considered its people “lazy and incompetent.” Id.  
102 See Umoff, supra note 97, at 71–73. The Harmon Doctrine originated in an opinion by then-United States 
Attorney General Judson Harmon, who in 1895 espoused the theory that nations possess absolute sovereignty over 
water within their territory. See 21 Op. Att’y Gen. 274 (1895). An application of this doctrine would preclude any 
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see Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried, Not Praised, 36 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 549, 549 (1996) (alleging that the United States never actually acknowledged the doctrine in practice).  
103 Charles J. Meyers & Richard L. Noble, The Colorado River: The Treaty with Mexico, 19 STAN. L. REV. 
367, 373 (1967).  
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infrastructure to facilitate water deliveries.106  
Article 10 of the treaty addresses specific allocations of Colorado River water. 107 
Specifically, Article 10 guarantees to Mexico an annual quantity of 1,500,000 acre-feet of 
Colorado River water.108  The treaty states that in the event that the United States determines that 
a surplus of water exists in a given year, Mexico may receive an additional quantity not in excess 
of 200,000 acre-feet. 109  Article 10 also contains a provision for proportionate sharing of 
consumptive use reductions between the two nations in the event that “extraordinary drought or 
serious accident to the irrigation system in the United States” renders it “difficult for the United 
States to deliver the guaranteed quantity of 1,500,000 acre-feet. . . . ”110 However, the treaty does 
not further clarify what circumstances might constitute an “extraordinary drought,” “serious 
accident,” or what would cause water to be “difficult . . . to deliver.”111 Thus, while the treaty 
clarifies the countries’ allocational arrangement, it leaves unresolved the meaning and 
administration of these ambiguous yet operative terms. 112  By allowing the United States to 
unilaterally determine the existence of a drought under this provision, the treaty permits the United 
States to deny Mexico equitable protections in the event of a triggering water scarcity event (i.e., 
one that the United States deems an “extraordinary drought”).113  
                                               
106 See id.  
107 Id. at art. 10(a).  
108 Id.  
109 See id. at art. 10(b).   
110 Id. 
111 See id.  
112 Id. The “extraordinary drought” clause is a potential source of immense conflict between the United States 
and Mexico, though such controversy has yet to erupt in an adjudicative setting. Jason Robison, The Colorado River 
Revisited, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 475, 504 (2017). As Professor Robison explains, “[a]t least two longstanding issues 
thus plague Article 10(b). One concerns the spatial and temporal characteristics for deeming a drought ‘extraordinary.’ 
The other is procedural: By whom, and through what processes, is this determination to be made?” Id.  The IBWC 
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1. Environmental Considerations Within the U.S.–Mexico Treaty 
 Aside from its unique Minute system,114 the Treaty embodies of international water law 
principles common to the governance of many rivers. Generally, international water law 
accommodates the competing policy goals of promoting the equitable allocation of transboundary 
waterways among riparian neighbors and maximizing economic development of water resources 
within each state’s borders.115 Historically, international water law has not promoted ecosystem-
level management or protection, and the U.S.-Mexico Treaty is no exception. The treaty emerged 
in an era that contemplated massive domestic water infrastructure projects for hydroelectric power 
and irrigation, while states entered into numerous interstate compacts that dedicated massive funds 
and flows to states and their planned infrastructure.116 The synthesis of these policies resulted in a 
“channel-based” legal regime that prioritizes the consistent delivery of flow entitlements, rather 
than holistic management of an entire river system.117 The scheme is organized for the delivery of 
water for consumptive uses, with little concern for how much water remains in the channel after 
legal flow obligations are fulfilled.118 The Morelos Dam, which diverts the United States’ flow 
obligation to Mexico’s Mexicali Valley for agricultural irrigation, is a perfect example of this 
traditional dam-and-divert regime.119 In classic form, the arrangement prioritizes diversions of the 
river’s natural course to canals for irrigation, lacking any kind of comprehensive environmental 
                                               
114 See infra notes 132–43 and accompanying text.   
115 A. Dan Tarlock, International Water Law and the Protection of River System Ecosystem Integrity, 10 
BYU J. PUB. LAW 181, 199 (1996) [hereinafter International Water Law].  
116 Id.  
117 International Water Law, supra note 115, at 199 (“International water law is a channel-based legal regime, 
as opposed to a watershed or ecosystem-based legal regime and this focus is inherently biased toward development 
and against ecosystem protection.”). 
118 Id.  
119 See A. Dan Tarlock, Four Challenges for International Water Law, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 369, 385, 389 
(2009) [hereinafter Four Challenges]. See also Jonathan S. King et al., Getting to the Right Side of the River: Lessons 
















Figure 4: Colorado River at Morelos Dam121 
Instead of contriving a plan to manage the entire river system holistically, the treaty and 
other river governance documents memorialized and have come to perpetuate mid-century values 
of economic development through the damming of reservoirs for the security of municipal growth, 
the creation of hydropower, and the satisfaction of water rights for agricultural users.122 These 
values remain mapped onto the entire landscape of the river to this day through various man-made 
channels, dams, and diversions designed to deliver water for economically profitable use by 
humans.123 As the geographer Eric Perramond has described while studying the river and the 
economy surrounding it, “Attend any public meeting on water in [the United States] and you will 
hear water experts and housing developers calling for water to be put to its ‘highest economic use.’ 
What they mean is for water to be moved from X function to Y function so as to generate greater 
economic value per acre-foot. . . . When farmers or rural residents hear this, what they hear is ‘let’s 
                                               
120 Id.  
121  Amy McCoy, Rivers of Reform, Global Water Forum, available at 
http://www.globalwaterforum.org/research/rivers-of-reform/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2019).  
122 See Umoff, supra note 97.  
123 PERRAMOND, ERIC, UNSETTLED WATERS: RIGHTS, LAW, AND IDENTITY IN THE AMERICAN WEST, 421–26 
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get water away from farmers and ditches . . .  and get it to the suburbs, the city, industries, or more 
suburbs.’”124   
2. International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) Treaty Authority  
 Organizationally, the treaty created the International Boundary and Water Commission 
(IBWC) for administration of the treaty’s provisions.125 The IBWC is  a binational administrative 
body responsible for the interpretation and execution of treaty provisions.126 The IBWC consists 
of both United States and Mexican “Sections,” analogous to state agencies.127 Structurally, a single 
Commissioner heads the IBWC Section for the United States and oversees three lower departments 
for Operations, Engineering, and Administration.128 Among these departments, the Operations 
Department maintains approximately one hundred hydrologic gauging stations and performs water 
accounting functions of the Colorado River waters regarding flow ownership between the 
countries.129 The Engineering Department provides technical and policy support and advice to the 
Commissioner regarding environmental impacts, water quality, and infrastructure maintenance.130 
Finally, the Administration Department manages funding and analyzes programs to streamline 
operations and reduce unnecessary spending.131  
                                               
124 Id. at 14.  
125 U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 96, at art. 2. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. The Sections function similarly to state departments or agencies. Robert J. McCarthy, Executive 
Authority, Adaptive Treaty Interpretation, and the International Boundary and Water Commission, U.S. - Mexico, 14 
U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 197, 201 (2011). The Mexican counterpart to the American IBWC, the Comisión 
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Límites y Aguas, SECRETARÍA DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES (last visited Dec. 7, 2018), 
https://cila.sre.gob.mx/cilanorte/.  
128 IBWC, U.S. IBWC Organizational Structure, https://www.ibwc.gov/Organization/organization.html (last 
visited April 27, 2019).  
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3. Article 24 Minute System 
 Together, the three departments advise the Commissioner as to the projects and decisions 
she shall implement in coordination and agreement with the Commissioner of the Mexican Section 
subject to Article 24 of the treaty.132 Article 24 of the treaty grants rulemaking authority to the 
IBWC Sections to carry out studies, construct works and projects, and negotiate agreements 
pertaining to the river and its limitrophe (riparian) parts.133  
The IBWC records its decisions made subject to Article 24 in the form of “Minutes,” which 
each government then has the option to ratify through a fairly simple process.134 The IBWC 
publishes Minutes in both English and Spanish.135 The Minutes must also be “signed by each 
Commissioner and attested by the Secretaries, and copies thereof forwarded to each Government 
within three days after being signed.”136 Excepting situations where the specific approval of the 
two Governments is required by another provision of the treaty, “if one of the Governments fails 
to communicate to the Commission its approval or disapproval of a decision of the Commission 
within thirty days. . . the Minute in question and the decisions which it contains shall be considered 
to be approved by that Government.”137 Since the passage of the treaty, the IBWC has recorded 
324 treaty Minutes.138  
The treaty’s Minute system is novel in terms of the authority it delegates to the IBWC to 
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133 U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 96, at art. 24.  
134 Id. art. 25. See infra notes 156–187 and accompanying text. For more information on Commission 
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interpret the treaty to initiate of new policy objectives. Through Article 24, the IBWC has exercised 
“adaptive treaty interpretation,” allowing the IBWC to construe its enabling treaty for new policy 
initiatives.139 From one angle, critics have commented that this interpretive authority belongs 
implicitly with the judicial branch subject to constitutional principles. From another, critics have 
also challenged that the IBWC’s decisions cannot have the force of domestic law absent the 
passage of federal statutes.140  While leaving unresolved theoretical issues about whether the 
delegation of treaty interpretation powers to the IBWC is proper, the treaty in practice resolves 
issues regarding the IBWC and separation of powers by explicitly delegating interpretive functions 
to the IBWC. Still, critics have leveled their challenges with a heavier hand in instances where it 
seems the IBWC has passed Minutes that “wander[] far from the explicit mandates” of the 
Treaty.141 Two such instances where the IBWC appears to have exceeded the text of the treaty 
include Minutes 242 and Minute 306, which the IBWC implemented to respectively require 
mandatory consultation between the countries prior to developing groundwater resources and to 
promise cooperation between the United States and Mexico in undertaking ecological studies on 
the delta.  
Starting in 2000, however, the IBWC has utilized the treaty’s Minute system to facilitate 
deliveries of water designed to reinvigorate the delta.142 Several remarkable minutes, the latest of 
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which is Minute 323, document the IBWC’s growing, but hesitant, commitment to the Colorado 
River’s environmental health—to that of the delta in particular.143    
B. TREATY MINUTES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 
1. 2000: Minute 306  
 The IBWC recorded its first Minute contemplating environmental restoration of the delta 
in 2000. 144  Minute 306, the first of several “ecological Minutes,” committed the IBWC to 
“establish a framework for cooperation by the United States and Mexico through the development 
of joint studies that include possible approaches to ensure use of water for ecological purposes in 
this reach and formulation of recommendations for cooperative projects, based on the principle of 
an equitable distribution of resources.”145 Minute 306 was merely a temporary phase of planning 
for later environmental flows programs.146 In addition, the IBWC agreed in Minute 306 to define 
the habitat needs of marine and wildlife species of concern to each country through a binational 
task force.147 Ultimately, Minute 306 represented an important phase of conservation research and 
planning, tabling for another Minute the actual implementation of—or collaboration in furtherance 
of—any on-the-ground conservation solutions.148 
2. 2010: Minutes 316 and 317 
 In 2010, the IBWC adopted Minutes 316 and 317, both in contemplation of specific 
                                               
143 See infra sec. III(D).   
144 IBWC, MINUTE NO. 306, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNITED STATES-MEXICO STUDIES FOR FUTURE 
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE RIPARIAN AND ESTUARINE ECOLOGY OF THE LIMITROPHE SECTION OF THE 
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opportunities to operationalize the cooperative framework that Minute 306 proposed.149 Minute 
316 authorized the temporary conveyance of up to 10,000 acre-feet of water through the Santa 
Clara Wetland, located in the delta, for its temporary rejuvenation.150 The United States, Mexico, 
several environmental organizations from both countries, and a number of American water 
agencies, furnished flows for the agreement.151 Participating entities also pledged approximately 
$350,000 USD for general monitoring and canal repairs.152 Instead of prompting lasting changes 
in the delta region, Minute 316 facilitated the monitoring and inventory of opportunities for active 
management of the delta wetlands in the future.153 Minute 317 expanded on the planning effects 
of Minute 316, requiring the IBWC to explore the potential for specific binational conservation 
projects to reduce shortages and generate new water sources.154 The greatest impact of Minutes 
316 and 317 was to orient the United States and Mexico toward increased collaborative capacity 
for an eventual environmental flows program by opening their channels for planning and 
                                               
149  Chandler Clay, Bringing the River Back to the Sea, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, 
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Adriana Zuniga-Teran et al., Resilience in an Uncertain Future: Part 1, INT’L WATER SECURITY NETWORK (2016), 
http://www.watersecuritynetwork.org/resilience-in-an-uncertain-future/. The wetland now provides habitat for 
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3. 2012-2017: Minute 319 
 It was not until Minute 319 that IBWC negotiations resulted in a robust release of actual 
flows to the delta sufficient to emulate historical flooding patterns and to reinvigorate the water 
table. In 2012, the IBWC met in Coronado, California, and recorded Minute 319, which contained 
substantive measures for rewatering and restoration of the delta.156 In the creation of Minute 319, 
“[t]he Commissioners referred to Minute 306, which provided a conceptual framework for United 
States–Mexico studies related to the riparian and estuarine ecology of the Colorado River 
limitrophe and delta.” 157  Minute 319 noted, “to the extent additional water supplies can be 
identified, it is desirable to have water for environmental purposes flow to the Colorado River 
limitrophe and delta ecosystem.”158 Upon the recommendations of the Minute 306 task force, 
Minute 319 introduced a pilot environmental flows program to expire with the Minute on 
December 31, 2017.159 Specifically, the program called for “a schedule of monthly flows, delivery 
points and volumes in an amount of approximately 105,392 acre-feet (130 mcm) for pulse flow 
and 52,696 acre-feet (65 mcm) for base flow.”160 
 Binational collaboration, bolstered by the heavy advocacy of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) from both countries, was a necessary force in negotiating commitments to 
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delta flows. 161  Minutes 306, 316, and 317 each involved some level of non-governmental 
collaboration, which increased under Minute 319.162 To this end, preceding minutes, including 
Minutes 306 and 316, had established a Binational Environmental Work Group composed of 
representatives from both governments, NGOs, and water users, who together researched and 
proposed the substantive recommendations for an environmental flows program.163 A separate 
Binational Coalition of NGOs also helped facilitate negotiations and implement the flows program 
of Minute 319, with goals of benefitting multiple restoration areas along the river corridor in the 
delta that Binational Coalition members already actively managed.164  
 As noted, flows under the Minute 319 pilot program consisted of both base flows (small 
periodic releases of water) and pulse flows (large releases of water simulating natural flooding) to 
emulate, on a small scale, the pre-development conditions of the river.165 During the term of 
Minute 319, the Binational Coalition provided base flows in the amount of 52,696 acre-feet for 
delivery to two river restoration areas below Morelos Dam (located at the international border 
between the Arizona and Baja, California).166 In addition to the base flow, the United States and 
Mexico provided water for a pulse flow in the amount of 105,392 acre-feet.167 On January 31, 
2014, United States Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell and Mexican Secretary of Environment 
and Natural Resources Juan José Guerra Abud announced the release of the pulse flow from 
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Morelos Dam, simulating the natural springtime flooding that invigorated the river for 
millennia.168 Under the terms of Minute 319, the IBWC delivered water over an eight-week period, 
beginning on March 23, 2014, and ending on May 18, 2014.169 On May 14, 2014—for the first 
time since 1997—the Colorado River flowed into the Gulf of California.170  
 Those involved with implementing the environmental flows program of Minute 319 
approached the pulse flow release with hesitant optimism, uncertain whether the flow would 
simply disintegrate into the sand and mudflats or reach all the way to the sea.171 In achieving the 
latter, the pulse flow inundated approximately 4,000 acres of the main channel, mobilized 
sedimentary deposits, and recharged regional aquifers to a maximum extent of nine meters.172 One 
goal of the pulse flow was to restore riparian vegetation, accomplished by timing the pulse flow 
with natural seeding cycles.173 While the flow had no discernible effect on fish or most fauna, the 
abundance and diversity of migratory waterbirds increased drastically—up to 42% in some areas 
on the riparian corridor. 174  The pulse flow also reduced surface water salinity, temporarily 
reducing favorable conditions for some invasive species growing along the riparian corridor.175 
The pulse flow did not have a detectable effect in the estuary, even though the flow achieved 
connectivity between the river and gulf.176  
 Environmentalists’ euphoria upon the success of the pulse flow matched only the surprise 
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and excitement of community members throughout the delta region, including children who had 
never known the river to exist and older residents who could remember when the delta’s waters 
supplied a source of livelihood to their communities.177 Among these observers in particular were 
members of the indigenous Cucapá community, who rejoiced at the sight of water permeating the 
delta’s mudflats.178  
 In the midst of celebrating the presence of water in the delta once more, stakeholders 
nonetheless acknowledged the reality that the effects of the pulse flow were only temporary.179 
Following the pilot flows program, native species abundance and diversity decreased still exceeded 
the levels observed in 2013, but steadily decreased in the following three years of monitoring.180 
While the pulse flow stimulated new growth of some riparian vegetation, the program in its entirety 
emulated only 1% of the delta’s traditional base flow and natural flooding.181 Of the total volume 
of pulse flow, only approximately 9% reached the lower 70 kilometers of the delta region as 
surface water.182 Overall, the flow inundated fewer target restoration areas than anticipated and 
failed to recruit substantial new growth of native riparian vegetation.183  Even Minute 319’s 
unprecedented allocation of flows became only another short-lived experiment in a long line of 
minutes designed to study the potential for restoration, without triggering lasting restorative 
change.184 In its final monitoring report, the IBWC noted that “exceptional natural floods,” far 
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more substantial than those mimicked by the pulse flow, would be critical to major changes in the 
delta ecosystem.185  In recognition of its own limitations, Minute 319 called for the formation of a 
successor Minute to carry on the mission of the pilot program, though stopping short of 
recommending a permanent framework for delta flows.186 
4.  Current Era: Minute 323 (2017-2026) 
 On September 21, 2017, the IBWC met in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, and recorded Minute 
323.187 This Minute contains sturdier and more permanent provisions for environmental flows, 
which Minute 319 merely contemplated.188 Minute 323 took effect upon its signing, replacing 
Minute 319 and preempting Minute 319’s sunset date of December 31, 2017.189 Among its many 
other provisions, Minute 323 registered the commitment of the United States, Mexico, and the 
Binational Coalition to deliver limited flows for the express benefit of the delta from 2017 to 
2026.190 In creating Minute 323, the IBWC and the Binational Coalition (whose expertise the 
IBWC employed):  
referred to the results achieved in the Minute 319 pilot program for water for the 
environment, including enhancing the ecosystem’s vegetation and wildlife, 
generating social and recreational benefits, improving conditions in the estuary, and 
recharging the aquifer. They also reflected on how to maintain the benefits of the 
pilot program while continuing joint cooperative efforts to provide water for the 
environment.191  
 
Citing these hefty aspirations, Minute 323 has been widely commended as an example of 
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successful international collaboration for environmental improvement.192 However, as discussed 
below, Minute 323 fails to achieve its full potential in terms of environmental impact and social 
sustainability.193  
 Minute 323 expanded on the successes of Minute 319 by dedicating more substantial flows 
to the delta over a considerably longer period of time.194 The Binational Coalition again played an 
instrumental role in negotiating and procuring flows for the program.195 Minute 323 sets forth the 
following program for environmental flows in Section 8 (“Environment”), with obligations for 
funding and water to be split evenly among the United States, Mexico, and the Binational 
Coalition:  
• 210,000 acre-feet of water for environmental purposes within Mexico over 
the nine-year duration of the Minute;  
• $9 million USD of funding for scientific research and monitoring; and  
• $9 million USD of funding for restoration projects.196  
 Although Section 8 seemingly purports to split flows and funding obligations jointly 
among the three participating entities, the United States’ flows commitment technically derives 
from Mexico’s share of water when construed in the context of other sections.197 Under Section 9 
of Minute 323, concerning “Investments and Projects,” the United States agrees to invest an 
additional and separate $31.5 million USD of funding for the improvement and development of 
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various Mexican conservation projects, including canal lining, on-farm conservation, reservoir 
regulation, fallowing, technical operation of irrigation districts, system operations, and wastewater 
effluent reuse systems.198 The Minute’s negotiators expect the conservation projects to conserve 
significant quantities of water in an amount sufficient to satisfy the Minute 323 environmental 
flows obligations of the United States.199 For its part, the Binational Coalition collaboratively 
raised its share of funds and secured flows in the amount of 70,000 acre-feet, although it expects 
to far exceed this obligation before 2026.200 The Minute also contemplates that the Binational 
Coalition will raise $1 million toward a project of wastewater effluent reuse in partial fulfillment 
of its water delivery obligations.201 
 Timing of the Minute’s delivery obligations also differ slightly among the participating 
entities.202 The Minute expects parties to fulfill their funding and flow commitments within three 
years of the Minute’s effective date, but the United States is not required to fulfill its flow 
commitment until the five years from the Minute’s adoption.203  
 Minute 323 does not specifically designate the total volume of water to base or pulse flows, 
in contrast to Minute 319.204 It is unclear to what type of flow or upon what schedule the IBWC 
will allocate the cumulative 210,000 acre-feet of water.205 However, the Binational Coalition 
                                               
198 Id.  
199 Id. Under Minute 323, with reference to those waters generated or conserved from the United States’ 
investments in Mexican conservation projects, “[a]ll of the waters generated or conserved . . . will be allocated to 
Mexico except for the following volumes: 70,000 acre-feet (86 mcm) of water to satisfy the U.S. commitment noted 
in Section VIII . . . to provide water for the environment, especially the Colorado River Limitrophe and Delta . . . .” 
Id. at 18. 
200 RAISE THE RIVER, supra note 168.  
201 MINUTE 323, supra note 8, at 18–19.  
202 See id. at 16. 
203 Id.   
204 MINUTE 319, supra note 157, at 17–18.  









suggests that water provided under the terms of Minute 323 will benefit existing restoration areas, 
as well as expand restoration efforts to wetlands beyond the delta’s main channel.206 In Minute 
323 the IBWC  does not expressly contemplate a successor Minute; that is, although Minute 323 
will expire in 2026, the Minute does not create an obligation for the IBWC to supplant the 
substantive provisions of Minute 323 with any kind of similar program in the future.207   
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF MINUTE 323’S DELTA FLOWS PROGRAM 
Minute 323 currently represents the most robust effort ever undertaken to promote 
restoration of the delta in terms of dedicated flows and funding.208 The Minute also emerged as an 
example of binational cooperation at a time when the United States and Mexico have otherwise 
been unable to find common ground on sundry policy matters.209 At the same time, the Minute’s 
modest flows and funding provisions, its temporary duration, and its limited adherence to 
principles of equity diminish the Minute’s effectiveness.210 The environmental flows program for 
the delta, as it currently stands under Minute 323, fails to institute transformative change, instead 
reflecting a persisting reluctance to commit to permanent and substantial reservations to the delta 
ecosystem.211  
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A. FUNDING AND FLOWS RECOMMENDATIONS NOT ADOPTED 
 The most significant shortcoming of Minute 323 is its failure to provide funding or flows 
sufficient to restore a larger portion of the delta.212 While the Binational Coalition and its partners 
have accurately praised Minute 323 as an unprecedented commitment of environmental flows and 
funding toward restoration of the delta, 213  the Minute’s actual commitments are weak in 
comparison to the terms that the technical Binational Environmental Work Group (Work Group) 
recommended.214 Prior to the enactment of Minute 323, the Work Group prepared a proposal 
recommending quantities of water and funding adequate for the restoration of over 3,000 
additional acres of the delta over nine years—a modest goal in comparison to the delta’s historical 
significance of two-million acres.215 As stated in the preface to the environmental flows provisions 
of Minute 323:  
[T]he Binational Environmental Work Group has analyzed environmental benefits 
that could be generated under this Minute and, after considering various amounts 
of environmental water, recommended as a target an average annual volume of 
45,000 acre-feet (55 mcm) and restoration funding of up to $40 million dollars over 
the term of the Minute would be desirable to maintain existing environmental 
restoration sites and to benefit other sites in the Colorado River Delta riparian 
corridor and estuary. The group has also identified opportunities to expand the 
existing 1,076 acres (435 hectares) of restored native habitat to 4,300 acres (1,700 
hectares).216 
The actual funding and flow provisions of Minute 323 fall drastically short, amounting to about 
half of the levels recommended by the Binational Environmental Work Group.217 Specifically, 
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under the terms of Minute 323, the funding dedicated to research, monitoring, and restoration totals 
only $18 million over the course of nine years, less than half of what the Work Group 
recommended.218 Actual dedicated flows fared similarly, measuring slightly over 23,000 acre-feet 
of water per annum over the nine-year term rather than the recommended 45,000 acre-feet.219  
 In an interview with the Binational Coalition’s co-chair for the United States, Jennifer Pitt, 
the IBWC did not commit to the funding and flow levels that the Work Group proposed due to the 
unavailability of water in that amount.220 The IBWC reduced funding to match the proportion of 
water available. 221  In fulfillment of its Minute 323 obligations, the Binational Coalition has 
purchased water rights from the Mexicali Valley for reallocation to the delta.222  In fact, the 
Binational Coalition expects to far exceed its Minute 323 commitments.223 Conversely, the United 
States and Mexico have each dedicated flows to the Delta that do not yet exist, as they will result 
only from pending conservation projects operationalized under Minute 323.224 Thus, while Minute 
323 represents at the very least a modicum of progress against the paucity of water in the delta,  
the disparity between the recommended and adopted conservation regimes reveals the need to 
procure more substantial commitments to the delta environment from the two sovereigns.225  
B. POLITICS OF RESTORATION: OBSTACLES TO AN EFFECTIVE FLOWS PROGRAM 
1. Reluctant Sovereigns 
 Neither Mexico nor the United States has historically prioritized delta conservation or 
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restoration, which is now clearly evidenced by the area’s desiccation.226 As Pitt notes, the inability 
to procure sufficient flows and funds for the delta is symptomatic of the reluctance of either Mexico 
or the United States to take responsibility for the delta. 227  This failure comes in spite of 
international obligations, such as those set forth in the Stockholm Convention, that require states 
to act with regard for the extraterritorial environmental impacts of their water usage. 228 
International water law has developed with increasing emphasis on nations managing 
transboundary waters in line with this obligation.229 
 While Mexico points to the United States as the upstream source of flow scarcity causing 
dryness in the delta, the United States has made clear its disinterest in mitigating environmental 
degradation of the river, the effects of which are most troubling in Mexico at the delta.230  
This disconnect in burden-sharing creates a problem that social scientists have deemed a 
“wicked problem.”231 Wicked problems result from forces of fragmentation that occur when each 
stakeholder in a decision-making process determines that their characterization of the problem is 
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the correct one. 232  When government actors become embroiled in a wicked problem, non-
governmental agencies must often step in to circumvent the cycle of fragmentation.233 In this case, 
Mexico and the United States characterize differently the root of the delta’s dewatering to evade 
liability.234 Here, the collaborative processes undertaken over the course of Minutes 306, 316, 317, 
318, 319, and 323 would not have been possible absent the pains and toils of the Binational 
Coalition (Raise the River),235 which took on a facilitative role to reserve flows for conservation  
of the river and delta when the governments failed to act.236 The Binational Coalition credits its 
more ample involvement in restoration to having fewer political and legal obstacles to navigate 
than the governments, allowing it to seek out private donors, for instance.237 
 Although the Binational Coalition has been a positive and motivating force for delta 
restoration, the capacity of non-governmental actors to meaningfully and permanently transform 
the law or hydrology of the river to better protect the environment is dubious.238 Traditionally, 
only states have rights or obligations under public international law, providing few answers 
regarding the Binational Coalition’s rights, liabilities, or legal duties.239 The participation of a 
private coalition does not excuse the governments’ failure to proactively pursue adequate 
conservation solutions, as the United States and Mexico have international obligations to fulfill 
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the role of environmental protection.240 The unwillingness of either Mexico or the United States 
to embrace responsibility for the delta’s decline poses a formidable policy obstacle.241 Although 
both countries have come together in collaboration over various Minutes, the relatively inadequate 
level of flows committed to the delta, as compared to the recommended levels, reflects the 
countries’ residual hesitancy.242  
 The Binational Coalition believes its role in the delta can and should expand in the future, 
given the results of previous ecological Minutes.243 However, apart from theoretical problems with 
a private organization stepping into the role of delta caretaker, the Binational Coalition’s water 
marketing approach involving the purchase of private water rights will become less sustainable as 
climate change diminishes remaining flexible water sources.244 Scientists project that climate 
change will reduce Colorado River’s flows by almost twenty percent nine percent by 2050, under 
conservative estimates.245 The intensely agricultural Mexicali Valley, from which the Coalition 
purchased water rights to fulfill their Minute 323 obligations, already experiences shortages and 
declining water tables.246 As the region’s water becomes increasingly unaffordable under the 
influences of climate change and regional growth, the Coalition may be unable to match the 
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demands of the delta.247 This is particularly likely absent a joint commitment from the United 
States and Mexico to fairly contribute water and funding in the future.248  
2. Principles of Equity 
 Critics have also disparaged Minute 323 for failing to contrive an equitable agreement 
between the two countries, even as private organizations step in to remediate the environmental 
program’s shortcomings. 249  Equity and fairness are important not only to maintain the 
collaborative capacity between the United States and Mexico for the future, but also because they 
are guiding principles of international water law.250 Experts have noted that “each riparian state is 
entitled to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of an international water 
resources . . . [the principle] balance[es] the possible detrimental consequences of an upstream 
nation’s use of a shared resource against the beneficial results of the use.”251  United States 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, as well as the U.N. Watercourses Convention, declare equity a 
“fundamental rule governing the use of international watercourses.”252 This principle enjoins 
upstream nations from unilaterally consuming or damming a shared river to the detriment of 
downstream riparians.253  
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 The U.S.-Mexico Treaty itself has long been the subject of criticism for allocating a 
disproportionately small share of flows to Mexico, as well as affording the United States 
extraordinary discretion in determining its drought obligations to Mexico.254 Minute 323 similarly 
fails to mandate equitable commitments between the United States and Mexico in terms of the 
water resources each country must supply.255 As previously noted, the United States will invest 
$31.5 million USD in Mexican water infrastructure under the Minute’s terms to fund 
improvements and modernizations for canal and farm infrastructure.256 The United States will 
receive credit for water generated through these conservation projects to satisfy its expected 
contribution of 70,000 acre-feet for the delta.257 The United States will not provide water for the 
program from its own domestic share of the river, or modify its existing water allocations to 
accommodate the delta flows program in any way.258 
 Members of the Mexican public and government officials of the Mexicali Valley have 
voiced resounding dissatisfaction with this arrangement, alleging it effectively permits the United 
States to purchase water from Mexico in violation of Article 10 of the treaty.259 The Mexicali 
Valley, a critical agricultural hub for both Mexico and the United States, has experienced water 
shortages and droughts in the last several years, with climate change and increasing demand 
projected to worsen these conditions in the future.260 Although the investment arrangement will 
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promote conservation and augment Mexico’s available water, critics allege that the exchange 
generates a dangerous precedent that allows the United States to substitute money for water in 
fulfillment of its treaty obligations to Mexico.261 As Mexican Senator Marco Antonio Blasquéz 
Salinas stated:   
The sale is disguised as an ‘infrastructure replacement program . . . . ’ The delivery 
of water by infrastructure, that is, the sale of water, is a violation of the Water Treaty 
of 1944, because it denatures the essence of the agreement that consists in the just 
distribution of water . . . The sale of water implies, of course, a cut that deteriorates 
the precarious situation of the producers of the Mexicali Valley.262  
 
Though his view is not necessarily universal among Mexican policymakers and the Senator’s 
constituents, Senator Blasqúez Salinas reasonably interprets Minute 323 as asymmetrical.263 Given 
the backdrop of historically inequitable treaty-related conduct by the United States, Mexico may 
be justified in closely scrutinizing any perceived attempts by the United States to skirt its treaty 
obligations.264 Incidents of past inequity include the Colorado River salinity crisis, for instance, 
which manifested in the early 1960s.265 During that period, the United States denied an obligation 
under the treaty to deliver water to Mexico of high enough quality and low enough salinity to be 
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fit for irrigation and other uses.266 Minute 242 ultimately resolved this crisis, though some in 
Mexico still believe that the United States effectively violated the treaty with impunity for 
decades.267   
 In response to concerns that Minute 323 could aggravate underlying inequities in the treaty, 
the Binational Coalition has stated that maintaining or achieving equitable apportionment was not 
an operative function of Minute 323.268 According to Pitt, “[t]he Minute is not based on a standard 
of equity in that it is the output of two parties coming together and having a negotiation.”269 Pitt 
also noted that capable representatives negotiated on Mexico’s behalf, but even perceived 
inequities in Minute 323 could jeopardize the political will of Mexican policymakers to collaborate 
for environmental flows programs with the United States in the future.270  
 While on its face Minute 323 appears to create important environmental benefits, the 
Minute is neither fair, nor sufficient in terms of the length or size of the flows program. Quite 
simply, the Minute is a nine-year band-aid for structural issues in water governance and 
management that have desiccated and that will continue to cause damage the delta. The following 
section presents a deeper criticism to this end, also offering several alternative mechanisms to 
address the underlying inequities and insufficiencies that depreciate the potential environmental 
impact of Minute 323.271  
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V. MINUTE-BY-MINUTE NO MORE: CALL FOR TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE IN THE DELTA 
  Minute 323 represents the most recent development in a long line of Minutes to embolden 
the environmental restoration capacity of the treaty.272 However, Minute 323 fails to establish a 
lasting environmental flow program—or allocate any treaty flows whatsoever for instream 
ecosystem maintenance— rendering uncertain the future of the delta past 2026.273 The IBWC may 
eventually decide to negotiate another, stronger flows program through a successor Minute.274 
However, the flaws of Minute 323 are inherent to the Minute system, the treaty, and the passivity 
of the IBWC in interpreting its treaty for environmental purposes.275 For example, the treaty itself 
still operates upon a gross inflation of the river’s annual flows, resulting in chronic drought by 
definition. 276 Moreover, in text and application, the treaty perpetuates the prioritization of the very 
values (particularly economic and pro-development) responsible for the desiccation of the delta in 
the first place.277  The treaty carves only sparse provisions for the flow of water for the delta, 
protecting existing consumptive uses while not incentivizing primarily American industrial, 
agricultural, and municipal users to conserve water for the future sustenance of the river.278  
Despite the progress of successive ecological Minutes in supplying flows to the delta, the IBWC 
has failed to initiate a permanent or effective program to manage the Colorado River delta, in terms 
of scale, supply, and equity.  
A more effective program should call for the full innovation of existing assumptions and 
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governance on the river.279 The following sections explore three options for the creation of a 
permanent program, as well as their challenges.280  
A.      FUTURE ENVIRONMENTAL FLOWS PROGRAM OPTIONS 
 
 Like its predecessor flow programs, Minute 323 is not permanent and will expire in 
2026.281 The Binational Coalition has expressed its willingness to continue negotiating flows for 
the delta on a periodic timeline, with plans to return to negotiations in 2026 to arrange a successor 
program under an additional Minute.282 However, the federal governments are not required to 
accommodate this plan, as the IBWC is under no legal obligation to adopt a successor Minute for 
environmental flows for the delta upon Minute 323’s expiration.283  Similarly, the Binational 
Coalition participates under no discernible legal obligation to continue furnishing resources or 
valuable on-the-ground services upon the expiration of Minute 323.284 Given the considerable—
albeit, insufficient—amount of funding and water invested in the delta under the duration of 
Minute 319, and further dedicated under Minute 323, the IBWC has clear incentive to renegotiate 
in 2026 to avoid a loss of prior investments.285 However, neither the terms of Minute 323, nor the 
treaty guarantee such action.286  
 One obvious, but ultimately indeterminate, option for the delta’s future is to continue upon 
a trajectory of periodic minute negotiations, replicating the pattern to date of incremental growth 
                                               
279 See infra notes 168–210 and accompanying text.  
280 Id.  
281 MINUTE 323, supra note 8.  
282 Id.  
283 Id.  
284 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.  
285 See supra notes 156–207.  









through treaty minutes toward a more mature flows program.287 However, this option is not ideal 
in light of criticisms already discussed, primarily that neither the United States nor Mexico are 
under obligation to continue providing even a bottom line of flows.288 The delta faces competition 
for water from intensifying municipal and industrial demands, and there is no guarantee that 
negotiators will find water to spare in 2026.289 As noted above, climate change is projected to 
rapidly reduce the amount of water available in the United States, with reductions growing at an 
exponential rate as temperatures rise. As demands on the river also increase with growing 
populations and industries, water for the environment may fall further down the hierarchy of 
priority for IBWC planners.  
A second option would involve a permanent Minute with permanent obligations for the 
United States and Mexico to deliver water to the delta, but also with flexible mechanisms to 
manage the delta adaptively based upon climactic fluctuations.290 Treaty Minutes are not normally 
permanent, though Minute 242 is exemplary of the potential of the Minute process to craft lasting 
and permanent solutions.291  
A third, idealistic option would involve amending the treaty to codify a permanent 
environmental flow allocation deriving from Article 10 apportionments. This revision could timely 
prompt the amendment of Article 10 entirely, coinciding with efforts in the United States to reform 
domestic water management to reflect more accurate estimates of the river’s annual flows.292  
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A permanent environmental flows program under the second and third options would likely 
operate similarly. While functionally identical, however, an amendment to the treaty would 
modernize the agreement to make it more serviceable to modern values of environmental 
protection and international equity.293  
 Adopting a permanent environmental flows program for the delta—which at the same time 
would manage the environment adaptively against unpredictable challenges like climate change—
involves the pursuit of conflicting policy goals. 294  While the Minute system is inherently 
transitory, it is also important to avoid creating a permanent program that prescribes to the delta 
an overly rigid flows regime that repeats the fallacies of the river’s present allocation—that climate 
or water supply are not static.295 An effective program would begin by creating a permanent 
governance framework in which adaptive management could occur.296 Stated simply, adaptive 
management operationalizes the idea that management strategies should reflect and respond to 
new scientific information.297 To achieve the goals of environmental protection and international 
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equity, a new delta flows program would incorporate more binding and permanent 
recommendations that draw flows from the existing treaty allocations, and that is informed by 
diversified stakeholder involvement.  
B.      RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PERMANENT ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
1. Binding Expert Recommendations 
Though drawing from the network of entities that launched Minute 323—including the 
IBWC, a Binational Environmental Work Group with technical expertise, and the Binational 
Coalition—a reformed program could better utilize environmental expertise to establish binding, 
substantial, and permanent environmental resolutions. 298  A reinvented environmental flows 
program should rectify traits of the water governance framework that contributed to the 
weaknesses of Minute 323, while strengthening those components that made it effective.  
Among the strengths of the Minute 323 administrative framework is the Binational 
Environmental Work Group, which is composed of water users, NGOs, and government officials 
with technical expertise in water management.299 Along with the Binational Environmental Work 
Group employed in Minute 323, similar work groups participating in the other ecological Minutes 
facilitated collaborative binational decision-making and empowered stakeholders. 300  A new 
program should employ a permanent work group with a similar technical, collaborative, and 
scientific capacity.301 Such an entity could assure through monitoring, mandatory review periods, 
and sunset dates on each iteration of an environmental program that the program is responsive to 
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the ecology of the delta, as well as other environmental concerns.302 Certainly, adaptive ecological 
and policy solutions at the international scale should also be pursued in light of domestic water 
challenges or policy innovations occurring in either country.303 
One glaring weakness of Minute 323, which it shares with other ecological Minutes, is that 
the Binational Environmental Work Group served a purely advisory and non-deferential role and 
was unable to make binding recommendations to the IBWC, as exemplified in the deficient flow 
and funding requirements that Minute 323 actually adopts.304 Rather than inhabiting a purely 
advisory role, a reformed program should afford substantial deference to the recommendations of 
a technical and collaborative work group.305  
Under the current treaty provisions, the IBWC commissioners have final authority on 
IBWC decisions and projects. Experiences in other water management settings offer advice for 
how to accommodate the role of an authoritative commissioner with increased authority to a work 
group representative of various groups. For instance, in water management decisions in the 
Resources appoints a technical panel and representatives of various interest groups to a Water 
Advisory Committee after receiving recommendations for membership composition from a 
separate governmental task force.306 The Water Advisory Committee drives the planning process 
for water allocation, although authority to make final decisions rests with the Minister. Thus, under 
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the Northern Territory framework:  
the Minister sets the boundary rule and holds the statutory responsibility to initiate 
the water planning process. The positions on the [Water Advisory Committee] are 
filled by representatives from several sectors, with the number of participants from 
each limited to one or two. The [Water Advisory Committee] largely drives the 
planning process which characterizes an ‘action arena’. . .307 
 
In this example, the “action arena” refers to outcomes produced through a particular policy setting, 
considering both individuals and institutions as variables affecting the scope of possible 
decisions. 308  This description of the relationship between the Minister and Water Advisory 
Committee is analogous to the current relationship between the IBWC and the Binational 
Environmental Work Group, where top-down institutional arrangements permit the Minister or 
IBWC to disregard the advice of stakeholder committees in final decisions. This top-down 
structure negates the effectiveness of collaboration taking place lower in the institutional hierarchy, 
and also breeds distrust.309 
 Institutions can increase their transparency, encourage trust, and promote collaboration by 
decentralizing some of the power and authority that rests with a single top-down decision-making 
entity. In the case of a reformed  work group’s interface with the IBWC,  a reformed work group 
should possess the capacity to make more binding recommendations as to source, volume, type, 
and timing of environmental flows, perhaps absorbing from the IBWC’s Engineering Department 
a delegation of authority to advise the Commissioner on these and related environmental 
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decisions.310 The treaty itself entrusts the implementation of the treaty to the IBWC, and not 
specifically to the Commissioner specifically.311 Within the parameters of Article 24, it would be 
possible to distribute decision-making powers further down the IBWC’s institutional hierarchy, 
lending more deference and finality to the decisions of a reformed work group operating within 
the Engineering Department. However, as discussed in the following sub-section, a work group 
afforded such deference must be representative of more diverse interests and stakeholder groups.  
2. Diversified Stakeholder Involvement 
The IBWC has historically been criticized for its failure to solicit public participation, make 
its decision-making process transparent, or consult with non-engineers in making decisions. For 
instance: 
The [IBWC] has been questioned by many border scholars and activists who 
criticize the IBWC for its inability to act as an independent border institution, and 
for the lack of transparency in its decision-making processes. The IBWC is 
infamous for being an old-fashioned, engineering driven institution that focuses on 
large, capital-intensive brick and mortar projects. The IBWC has also been 
criticized for being too slow and too bureaucratic and for being a nonpublic oriented 
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Increased public participation, incorporated into a reformed Binational Environmental Work 
Group, would boost both the transparency of IBWC decision-making and would increase the 
likelihood that IBWC restoration decisions are beneficial to a greater scope of possible 
stakeholders.  
According to Professor Noel Castree, the involvement of stakeholders in an ecological 
restoration regime has clear implications for the ideas and suggestions that are passed into 
policy.313 In the gamut of stakeholders that may possess an interest in a restoration site or the future 
of the delta as a whole, there is likely to be disconnect about what aspects of the space—and the 
human behaviors within it—should be preserved, restored, or altered. 314  Laws and policy 
pertaining to the environment are mapped onto the spaces which they govern, constructing place 
both politically and socially.315 Thus, the matter of stakeholder involvement in restoration projects 
is particularly vital: to what purpose is the delta restored, and to whose concept of nature is the 
delta returning?   
A reformed program could take instruction from domestic adaptive management programs 
that engage a diverse and more representative range of stakeholders. Diversified stakeholder 
representation has become standard across many domestic conservation regimes. For example, 
American conservation programs on the river, including the Upper Colorado River Endangered 
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Fish Recovery Program,316 the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program,317 and the 
Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program, 318  each incorporate input from 
between thirteen and fifty-seven discrete stakeholder groups.319 Among those interests represented 
are federal and state agencies, numerous Indian tribes, private and public water users, recreation 
groups, and NGOs.320 Incorporating a wider range of stakeholder input about the delta would not 
only lend legitimacy to the work group’s recommendations, but would also augment the group’s 
available base of knowledge.321 
A reformed work group within the IBWC should utilize input of the Cucapá Tribe and 
other delta community stakeholders, who have not received due representation during the 
negotiations of past environmental flow programs.322 Exemplary of the mode in which restoration 
efforts have displaced indigenous interests is the fact that the delta is currently designated as a 
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Biosphere Reserve in which culturally significant fishing practices are prohibited.323 While fishing 
remains an important pin in the Cucapá economy, the government of Mexico has refused to 
recognize the group’s right to fish following the Biosphere designation.324 In fact, while Cucapá 
people have experienced the effects of desiccation in the delta more intimately than any other 
group, the Mexican government has at the same time branded Cucapá fishing practices as 
destructive and targeted them for intervention.325 While the river’s return to its delta would be 
culturally significant for the Cucapá, it is unclear how the fishing economy might ever again 
benefit them.326  
The inclusion of more diverse stakeholders may bolster the capacity of governing entities 
to create effective water management policies. Fully informed water governance structures must 
utilize knowledge “in many forms,”327  including those which situate scientific realities within 
sociocultural contexts.328 While political, economic, and scientific interests all inhabit  influential 
space within the restoration plan, policymakers have also failed to account for the upstream 
cultural and lifestyle habits that dry up the delta before it reaches the sea. Minutes to resolve the 
desiccation of the delta have focused more on spatially and temporally isolated attempts at 
restoration, rather than a revision of the cultural norms which give communities license to use or 
benefit from the use of copious and inefficient amounts of water, without facing the consequences 
of that use.329 Minute 323 does nothing to incentivize the reduction of American water use; nor 
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does it offer any attempt to disrupt what cultural geographers have termed the “human flows” 
creating patterns of dryness and scarcity in a distant landscape.330 In the same way that a growing 
nationalist movement in the United States has prevented the flow of people across the border, it 
has fostered domestic sentiments of entitlement to water that threaten to further disenfranchise 
cross-border users and environments.331 Arguably, addressing not only the flows of water, but also 
the flows and interactions of people to understand their responsibilities to others and to the 
landscape the landscape is just as important to contriving a lasting solution in the delta and to 
overcoming the short-sighted planning that brought the delta to this point in the first place.  
 3. Equitable Contributions 
In terms of substantive change, IBWC should also be called upon to construct an 
allocational arrangement which equitably apportions responsibility for the health of the delta. Such 
an arrangement would acknowledge that upstream American demands and water governance 
mechanisms are at least partly culpable for the delta’s scarce flows. Although the United States 
has maintained its legal obligation to Mexico by delivering flows pursuant to Article 10,332 the 
United States bears responsibility for the environmental impacts it creates even outside of its 
borders through its contribution to global climate change having impacts on the river’s supply and 
through its inefficient water uses. In addition to decreasing available flows in the river, both the 
aforementioned factors increase the likelihood of the United States triggering the escape clause of 
Article 10, permitting it (at least theoretically) to retain Mexico’s apportionment upon a finding of 
“extraordinary drought.”333 
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 A truly collaborative arrangement would balance American culpability against greater 
conservation upstream for the benefit of the downstream channel, resulting in the increased flow 
of water to the delta. A full amendment of Article 10 to permanently allocate an amount of water 
for the delta would service this end of equity and force the countries to fulfill the role of 
transboundary environment protector. However, the treaty only allocates flows to Mexico, only 
obligating the United States to deliver Mexico’s share of 1.5 million acre-feet, and not determining 
the United States’ rights to the allocation therein.334 In the spirit of creating an arrangement where 
both countries bear responsibility for the delta, the entire allocation for the delta must not derive 
solely from Mexico’s existing 1.5 million acre-foot share of water. Instead, an amendment to 
Article 10 should increase the United States’ annual flow obligation to Mexico by half the amount 
of annual flows to be dedicated for instream flow to the delta. At that point, an amendment to 
Article 10 should dedicate an annual volume of flows to the delta specifically, from the 
proportionately increased Article 10 apportionment to Mexico.  
With respect to facilitating a procedurally equitable arrangement, the governments should 
continue to encourage equal American and Mexican participation in negotiations, though with the 
potential accompaniment of a full reform of the IBWC amenable to a diversified work group’s 
increased role in recommending the necessary sum of environmental flows.335 The Binational 
Coalition would also have a vested interest in continuing its involvement, likely through a lessened 
or modified role. 336  The Binational Coalition has proven its value as a representative of 
environmental interests among reluctant federal governments. 337  While it has exhibited its 
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tremendous utility as a facilitator, implementer, and advocate of these interests, a permanent 
arrangement must be accompanied by increased governmental responsibility and accountability to 
the delta, which may necessarily reduce the role that the Binational Coalition has historically 
filled.338  
4. A Permanent Program 
 A program with these provisions must also be anchored with an explicit and permanent 
commitment from the two governments to prioritize delta restoration. 339  A permanent flows 
management program could be facilitated under the IBWC’s existing delegation of rulemaking 
authority, through a permanent designation of environmental flows from the water resources 
allocated to Mexico under the treaty.340 As discussed above, an amendment to Article 10 that 
allocates flows for the Delta, and perhaps other environmental ends, would constitute a more 
permanent option that would allow the dedication of treaty flows for the environment.341   
 An amendment to the treaty, particularly one which modifies the allocational arrangement 
between the countries, would certainly incite political tensions in both the United States and 
Mexico. At the same time that an amendment would constitute a major political accomplishment, 
the treaty is ripe for review in the shadow of major changes in Colorado River supply and 
ecosystem conditions as a result of climate change. Both at the domestic level in the United States 
and internationally, the Law of the River must be updated to adequately respond to the threats of 
climate change. An amendment to the treaty reflective of a long-term commitment to the 
environment is a necessary element to this policy review.    
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 The Colorado River may never return to its former state, and the delta is one of its most 
broken reaches.342 Growing population and intensifying municipal and industrial demands on the 
river will further exacerbate existing shortages, leaving less water instream to maintain the delta.343 
Absent a clear and continuing commitment by the nations to furnish flows for the environment in 
the future, the delta remains in jeopardy. 
Although treaty minutes enacted over the last twenty years have memorialized a 
rejuvenated appreciation for the delta ecosystem, they have so far failed to champion a lasting or 
substantial program for its restoration. 344  This thesis has discussed the urgency for more 
transformative change, delineating several possible avenues of action for more permanent 
prioritization of the delta ecosystem.345 The treaty between the United States and Mexico must be 
amended to reflect modern values of environmental protection and equity, embracing collaboration 
against the threats of climate change.346 Of course, amending the existing foundational documents 
governing the Colorado River, or to create new ones, would present a daunting policy task for the 
governments, the Binational Coalition, and additional stakeholders.347 This task is formidable, but 
increasingly practical as the river’s overallocation becomes unfortunately apparent, and as the 
prioritization of its riparian ecosystems becomes a more desperate cause. 
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